THE ASSIGNABILITY OFEASEMENTS IN GROSS
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HEN we read in a legal textbook a rule of law'stated une-

quivocally, we are inclined to accept it. However, textbook
writers can make mistakes, and courts, by way of dicta, can
continue to repeat the mistakes.
Such a mistake has been made and continuously repeated by textbook
writers and by the dicta of the courts with respect to the question of the
assignability of easements in gross. As a result, much confusion has been
introduced into the realm of law dealing with the assignability of easements, and the courts have struggled to create exceptions so as not to follow an alleged rule which should have been renounced and forgotten long
ago.
In general, textbook writers and law publications recite the alleged rule
in virtually the same form in which it is set forth in American Jurisprudence:'
An easement in gross is a mere personal interest in the real estate of another.
Subject to some authority to the contrary, the rule followed by the great majority of
courts is that an easement in gross is so essentially personal to the grantee that it is
not assignable or inheritable and cannot be made so by the terms of the grant.
Such is the type of statement which is generally found in most of the
2
commercial legal publications.
The principal distinction between an easement in gross and an easement
appurtenant is that in the first there is not, and in the second there is, a
dominant tenement. 3 The ridiculousness of the alleged rule becomes immediately apparent when it is realized that easements for railroads, public highways, street and interurban railways, pipe lines, and canals, and
public service easements of all types, such as power lines and telephone
lines, are easements in gross. As a result of this erroneous statement of the
law by textbook writers and in early cases, the courts have generally felt
duty bound to repeat it by way of dictum, and have then proceeded to go
*Division Attorney, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Denver, Colorado.
1 Vol. 17, "Easements," § ii.
2Jones, Easements § 39 (1938); Thompson, Real Property § 341 (1939); Amer. & Eng.
Encyclopaedia of Law vol. 1o, p. 403 (2d ed., 1899); xg Corpus Juris § S.
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American Jurisprudence vol. 17, "Easements," § i2 (1938); 91 Corpus Juris § S.

THE ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS

to great lengths to find the easement involved in the particular case to be
an easement appurtenant, and, if unable to do so, have proceeded to create
an exception or to find a reason for not following the alleged rule.
The origin of the so-called rule was an early English case, Ackroyd v.
Smith,4 which held that the right, granted in a conveyance of land to the
grantees of the premises and all persons having occasion to resort thereto,
of passing, for all purposes, through a certain road having no terminus
upon the premises was not one which inhered in the land conveyed, did
not concern the premises conveyed or the mode of occupying them, and,
therefore, did not pass to a subsequent assignee of the land. The gist of
the decision, however, seems to be that the court thought the true construction of the granted right was to use the road for purposes unconnected with the enjoyment or use of the land and that such a right would not
pass to an assignee of the land "and appurtenances." The court said: "If a
way is granted in gross it is.personal only and cannot be assigned ....
so common in gross sans nombre may be granted but cannot be granted
over." Obviously, the quoted rule, if it were a rule, related to a mere easement of way or of passage which was not appurtenant to land and in which
there was no investment-the type of right which might well have.been
regarded as a mere license at that time.
The so-called rule of the Ackroyd case, if it were followed at all, should
have been limited in its application to easements or privileges of passage,
but the textbook writers and the courts, by dicta, in general referred simply to easements in gross. As a result, instead of strictly limiting the application of the so-called rule to easements of way or passage which were
not appurtenant and renouncing it in other types of cases and especially
in those in which the parties creating the easement obviously intended
that it should be assignable and not personal, the courts, generally, have
stated the alleged rule as a dictum, and then avoided it. So has confusion
grown.
It appears that the reason for the original pronouncement was that the
privilege granted (an easement of passage) was of the type which was ordinarily a mere license and that no fraud or serious deprivation of right
would result if assignment were not permitted. Further, it was the type
of easement which, if it could be assigned in severalty, or if it could be inherited, would lead to the possibility of a greatly expanded number of
people who would be entitled to use the easement. In the absence of recording statutes, of an accurate description of the way, of the way being
appurtenant to land, and of any investment in the easement, it can readily
4
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be seen that the early-day courts might not wish to encourage the continuous existence of such an easement. However, under present-day conditions, it is obvious that there is no good reason why all easements in
gross should not be held to be assignable, if such were the intention of the
parties.
The trend of modern law has been toward the encouragement of the encumbering of the fee title, as illustrated by the increased use of building
restrictions and zoning laws, and the recognition of many and varied
rights reserved or granted in lands, such as mineral reservations, oil and
gas leases, etc. With our modern recording acts, with their doctrine of
constructive notice, it is practicable to permit the imposition of all sorts
of encumbrances on realty, which, in the absence of such acts, would
have been a source of confusion and inconvenience. Furthermore, the
constant trend in modern law in the construction of written instruments
or the interpretation of contractual arrangements has been to carry out
the intention of the parties. In addition, it may be said that an easement
in gross is ordinarily a present interest in land such as we normally expect
to be assignable, and there appear to be no reasons of public policy to
prevent the grantor's intention from being carried out by making such an
interest freely alienable.
Despite the confusion which the repeated assertion of the alleged rule
has created, an examination of the cases does not support the rule as announced by the textbook writers. Although there are many dicta, the only
American cases which the writer has been able to find which can be said to
support the rule are the ones given in the appended footnote.5 Other cases
which are sometimes cited in support of the alleged rule are found to be
cases decided on the intention of the parties to convey a mere personal
and, therefore, nonassignable right.'
s Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Oh. St. 614 (1873) (private way).; Garrison v. Rudd, 19 Ill. 558
(1858) (private way); Waller v. Hildebrecht, 295 Ill. ii6, 128 N.E. 807 (.920) (alley for which
no real necessity); Stockdale v. Yerden, 220 Mich. 444, i9o N.W. 225 (1922) (private way of
which no formal assignment to plaintiff); Metzger & Co. v. Holwick, 17 Oh. C.C. 6o5, 6 Ohio
C. D. 794 (1895) (driveway for which no real necessity); Fisher v. Fair, 34 S.C. 203,13 S.E. 470
(1891) (private alley for which no real necessity); Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S.C.
542, 128 S.E. 724 (1925) (driveway for which no real necessity); Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C.
124, 28 S.E. 2d 644 (i944) (private alley for which no real necessity).
6 By proper construction of the language of the instrument, Hall v. Armstrong, 53 Conn.
554 ,4 Atl. 113 (1886); Mallet v. McCord, 127 Ga. 76r, 56 S.E.-joi5 (1907); Koelle v. Knecht,
99 111. 396 (1881); Wadsworth v. Smith, ii Me. 278, 26 Am. Dec. 525 ('834).; Ross v. McGee,
98 Md. 389, 56 Atl. 1128 (19o4); Wilder v. Wheeler, 6o N.H. 351 (i88o); Schultz v. Carter,
I53 Va. 730, 1S S.E. 130 (i93o); or by looking "to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing to be granted and the object to be attained, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties," Waller v. Hildebrecht, 295
Ill. 116, 128 N.E. 807 (.920).

THE ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS

All of the cases which are listed in the appended footnote, in support of
the rule, relate to mere easements of way or passage. In all other American
cases which the writer has found (aside from dicta or those which were decided on other grounds) the courts have either flatly refused to adopt the
alleged rule or have found other ways to circumvent its application. Some
courts have had the courage flatly to reject the alleged rule and to hold
that an easement in gross as such is capable of assignment. Thus Massachusetts, in Goodrich v. Burbank,7 held a vendor of land may reserve to
himself, "his heirs and assigns," the right of taking water forever from a
spring situated on the land through a pipe of definite dimensions and that
such right need not be annexed to any particular estate. Wisconsin expressed itself forcibly in Poull v. Mockley, 8 which involved a conveyance
to the grantee, "his heirs and assigns forever," of the right to take water
from a well on the grantor's premises, stating: "We cannot see any substantial reason for holding that an easement in gross cannot be assigned or
transferred, especially when the language of the grant shows unmistakably that the intention was that it should be enjoyed by the grantee, 'his
heirs and assigns.' "
New York, in holding a right of way for a railroad an easement in gross
which is transferable and inheritable like an estate in lands in Atlantic
Mills v. New York Cent. R. Co.,9 said:
The distinction oftimes made in the cases between a fee and an easement is based
upon the use of those terms as indicating the uses to 'vhich the land or right of way
may be devoted. A fee in this sense signifies the land itself, and the sum of all the
uses to which the land may be devoted, while an easement or incorporeal heriditament
is confined to a limited use. Nevertheless, in so far as duration of estates is concerned,
an easement, or right in gross may be perpetual and inheritable, and transferable as a
fee in lands.' °

In a recent New York case, Antonopulos v. Postal TelegraphCable Co.,the court, in upholding the assignability of an easement in gross for a telegraph pole line, limited by the grant to seven poles, refused to hold that
the grant conveyed an easement by implication for twenty-nine additional poles, saying:
72

Allen (Mass.) 459, go Am. Dec. 161 (1866), followed in Amidon v. Harris, 113 Mass.

59 (1873).
833 Wis. 482 (1873), followed in Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 8i Wis. 3oi, 5i N.W. 550 (1892),
with respect to an easement for a canal or raceway and a highway.
9 126 Misc. 349, 214 N.Y. Supp. 123 (1926).

10 Citing Miner v. New York Central & H. R.R. Co.,
"

261 App. Div. 564, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 4o3 (1941).
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It is difficult to conceive of a just basis for added rights by implication. This is
especially so when it is recalled that at one time an easement in gross was so narrowly
construed and was deemed so personal to the grantee that it was not assignable.
.... Later, although courts do not favor by construction an easement in gross ....
it was recognized as transferable and inheritable.
In general, however, the influence of the alleged rule was such that the
courts felt obligated to give it lip service, after which they proceeded to
negative or circumvent its application in numerous ways:
i. By giving effect to the evident intention of the parties that the easement in gross should be assignable.2. By saying a grant to one "his heirs and assigns" must be interpreted
to mean just what it says and that the law will recognize no difference in
their legal incidents, as affecting the burdened property, between easements appurtenant, incorporeal interests or estates in land in the nature
3
of easements but subordinate to the fee, or mere servitudes.'
3. By establishing almost universally the rule that an easement will
never be held or presumed to be in gross if it can fairly be construed to be
appurtenant. 4 This rule has been implemented by the adoption, in a
majority of jurisdictions, of the rule that a right of way may be appurtenant to land although the servient tenement is not adjacent to the domi2Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 200 At. 646 (1938). On
this subject, the court stated: "In regard to easements in gross generally, there has been much
controversy in the courts and by textbook writers and law students as to whether they have
the attribute of assignability. There are dicta in Pennsylvania that they are non-assignable.
Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter... : ; Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation,
309 Pa. s8, 63, 64, 163 A. r59, 89 ALR iiSo; Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 56 Pa. Super.
311, 315, 316. But there is forcible expression and even definite authority to the contrary.
Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 112, 113, 224 A. 351, 40 ALR 1516; Dalton Street

Railway Co. v. Scranton, 326 Pa. 6, 22, 291 A. 233. Learned articles upon the subject are
to be found in 3 2 Yale Law Journal 813; 38 Yale Law Journal 139; 22 Michigan Law Review

522; 40 Dickinson Law Review 46. There does not seem to be any reason why the law should
prohibit the assignment of an easement in gross if the par.ties to its creation evidence their
intention to make it assignable. Here, as in Tide Water Pipe Company v. Bell, the rights of
fishing and boating were conveyed to the grantee-in this case Frank C. Miller--'his heirs and
assigns,' thus showing that the grantor, the Pocono Spring Water Ice Company, intended to
attach the attribute of assignability to the privileges granted."
1 Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104,

224

Ad. 352 (2924).

'4 Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill. 455 (1882); Kuecken v. Voltz, iio
Ill. 264 (x884).; Whittaker v. Harding, 256 Ill. 248, 99 N.E. 94s (i922); Goldstein v. Raskin,
272 Ill. 249, ii N.E. 91 (i916); Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 Ill. 367, 222 N.E. 537 (2919); Jones v.
Stevens, 276 Mass. 328, 177 N.E. 92, 76 ALR 591 (1931); Akers v. Baril, 300 Mich. 629,
2 N.W. 2d 792 (1942); Collins v. Stewart, 302 Mich. 1, 4. NW. 2d 446 (2942); Wilson v.
Ford, 209 N.Y. 186, 202 N.E. 624 (1923); Atlantic Mills v. New York Central R. Co., 221
App. Div. 386, 223 N.Y. Supp. 2o6 (1927); Weigold v. Bates, I44 Misc. 395, 258 N.Y. Supp.
695 (1932); Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 309 Pa. 58, 63 At. 159 (2932).
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nant tenement xs Further, this rule has been extended in its scope by suggesting or declaring that when expenditures are made for a work which
the easement is designed to serve, the easement is appurtenant to the
work."6
4. By the recognition of the assignability of profits a prendre 7 and
then holding the easement to be either a profit a prendre or in the nature
of a profit a prendre.'5
5. By excepting water rights in gross and rights of way for ditches.' 9
6. By declaring the easement to be an interest or estate in land (as
distinguished'from an incorporeal right) because permanent structures
were installed in or erected upon the land.20
7. By distinguishing between easements designed for commercial exploitation and easements for personal enjoyment.
8. By declaring that of necessity the attributes of nonassignability do
not inhere in rights of way granted to public service corporations.22
9. By declaring that state statutes which provide that every species of
property, except a mere possibility not coupled with any interest, may be
transferred, make such rights assignable unless they are expressly or by
necessary implication made personal to a particular individual.23
io. By holding applicable to easements state statutes which declare
conveyances of real estate to be in fee, even though words of inheritance
ISSee annotation: "May right of way be appurtenant where the servient tenement is not
adjacent to the dominant." 76 ALR 597 (1932).
x6Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. 309 Pa. 58, i63 Atl. 159 (1932); Sweetland v. Grants Pass New Water, Light & Power Co., 46 Ore. 85, 79 Pac. 337 (19o5).
17 Profits a prendre in gross are universally held to be inheritable or assignable (if granted
in fee), even though not admeasurable, on the basis that such rights are interests in land. See
Amer. & Eng. Encyclopaedia of Law vol. 1o, p. 403 (2d ed., 1899); note in 32 Yale L. J.
813 (1923); 29 Corpus Juris § ii, and cases cited therein under note 25.
1s See Cross v. Berlin Mills Co., 79 N.H. 116, 105 AtI. 422 (1918); Davis v. Briggs, 117
Me. 536, io5 AUt. 228 (2928).
9snes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P. 2d 206 (1936); Patterson v. Chambers Power Co., 8i Ore. 328, 159 Pac. 568 (1916).
2o Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, 72 N.J. Eq. 492, 66 Atl. 427 (907); Cross v. Berlin Mills Co.
79 N.H. 116, zo5 Atl. 411 (1928); Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Lewis, 17 F. 2d 267
(D.C.E.D. Ky., 1926).
22

See Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa.

241,

200 AtI. 646 (1938).

22 Ocean Shore R. Co. v. Spring Valley Water Co., 87 Cal. App. 188, 262 Pac. 53 (2927).
2s Fudickar v. East Riverside Irr. Dist., io9 Cal. 29, 42 Pac. 1024 (1895); Callahan v.
Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. 2d 788 (1935).
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are not used unless a lesser estate is specifically provided for in the in24

strument.

With respect to the Illinois view, it will be noted that two Illinois cases,
Garrisonv. Rudd2- and Waller v. Hildebrecht,6 which involved easements
of way or passage, upheld the alleged rule that an easement in gross is
personal and not assignable. A reading of the last-mentioned case discloses that it was difficult to ascertain the intention of the parties as to
assignability. However, accepting both cases as authority for the rule in
Illinois, it is interesting to see how the effect of its adoption has been eliminated by other cases. Thus the Illinois courts have held'that an easement will not be presumed to be in gross if it can fairly be construed to be
appurtenant.2 7 Further limiting the possible application of the alleged
rule, Illinois has adopted the rule supported by the weight of authority
that a right of way may be appurtenant to land even though the servient
tenement is not adjacent to the dominant. Andin GoodwillieCo.v. Commonwealth Electric Co.28 it was held that not only is it not necessary that the
dominant and servient estates be contiguous, but it is not necessary that
the right of way should terminate on the dominant estate. The case just
cited has practically insured the ifiterpretation of an easement as assignable, if the parties so intended, by holding applicable to easements the
Illinois statute which provides that "every estate in lands which shall be
granted, conveyed or devised although other words heretofore necessary to
transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a fee simple
29
estate of inheritance if a less estate be not limited by express words.1
Michigan, which also adopted the alleged rule that an easement in
gross is personal and not assignable in a case involving an easement of
way or passage, likewise limited the possible application by adopting the
rule, in Collins v. Stewart,30 that an easement will not be held to be in gross
if it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant, and has sustained that rule
=4Salem Capital Flour Mills Co. v. Stayton Water-Ditch & Canal Co., 33 Fed. 146 (C.C.
Ore., 1887).; Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 242 Ill.
42, 89 N.E. 272 (igo9).
2S19 Ill. 558 (1858).
295 Ill. 1i6, 128 N.E. 807 (1920).
Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Koele, 104 Ill. 455 (2882); Kuecken v. Voltz, iio
Ill.
264 (1884); Whittaker v. Harding, 256 I1. x48, 99 N.E. 945 (2912); Goldstein et al v. Raskin et a]., 271 Ill. 249, II N.E. 92 (x6); Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 Ill. 367, 122 N.E. 537
26
27

(1919).

Ill. 42, 74, 89 N.E.

272 (19o9).
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Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. (penn. ed.), ch.

30302 Mich. i, 4 N.W. 2d 446 (1942).
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notwithstanding the silence of the deed as to the lands to which the ease3
ment might be appurtenant. '
Among the cases which have been cited as upholding the alleged
rule are three easement-of-way or passage cases from South Carolina.
However, it should be pointed out that in those cases the court stated that
the right of way was not reasonably or essentially necessary to the enjoyment of the premises, and that the rule in South Carolina is that for a
right of way to be appurtenant and to inhere in the land it must be necessary to the enjoyment of the land. Consequently, easements which would
elsewhere be held to be appurtenant must be held in South Carolina to be
in gross, if they are not essentially necessary to the enjoyment of the land.
It is apparent from what has been said that there is very little support
for the alleged rule, and what support there is, is confined to mere easements of way or passage. Furthermore, it will be noted that with the exception of a recent South Carolina case, decided under the unusual rule
of that state, the cases are fairly old and some of them are of very ancient
vintage. Arrayed against this weak and confined support for the alleged
rule are a considerable number of cases holding that an easement without
a dominant tenement may be created in perpetuity and may be, by its
terms, or by the intention of the parties, made assignable. These cases
cover a wide variety of types of easement. 3 ' Such being the state of the
law, it is high time for the courts and textbook writers to end the confusion
over the assignability of easements.
There is not now, and there has not been for a long time, any valid reason whatsoever why a distinction should be drawn between easements in
31In Akers v. Baril, 300 Mich. 619, 2 N.W. 2d 792 (I942).
32 Railroad right of way: Ocean Shore R. Co. v. Spring Valley Water Co., 87 Cal. App. i88,
262 Pac. 53 (1927); Atlantic Mills v. New York Central R. Co., x26 Misc. Rep. 349, 224 N.Y.
Supp. 123 (1926).

Street railway right of way: Dalton Street Railway Co. v. Scranton, 326 Pa. 6, i91 Aft. 133
(1937).
Water pipe line right of way: Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459, 9o Am. Dec. i6i
(i886); Amidon v. Harris, 113 Mass. 59 (1873).
Canal and highway right of way: Pinkum v. City of Eau Claire, 8i Wis. 3oi, 5i N.W. 550
(1892).

Mill race right of way: Patterson v. Chambers Power Co., 81 Ore. 328, z59 Pac. 568 (i916).
Right of way for booms in river: Cross v. Berlin Mills Co., 79 N.H. 116, io5 At]. 411 (1i8).
Oil pipe line right of way: Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, 72 N.J. Eq. 492, 66 At. 427 (907).
Oil pipe line and telegraph and telephone lines: Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 204,
124 Atl. 351 (1924).
Telegraph line right of way: Antonopulos v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 261 App. Div.
564, 26 N.Y. Supp. 2d 403 (941).
Power line right of way: Sweetland v. Grants Pass New Water, Light & Power Co., 46
Ore. 85, 79 Pac. 337 (N9os).
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gross and easements appurtenant with reference to assignability or inheritability. As stated previously, it is understandable that the'early-day
courts, in the absence of public records, should have been loath to encourage the continuous existence of easements of way or passage which
were not appurtenant to land. Such easements, being unconnected with
the use or enjoyment of land, were not of a nature to place a subsequent
purchaser of the servient tenement upon notice; and, if they were assignable or inheritable, there was no way in which the owner of the servient
tenement could readily ascertain what persons were entitled to the enjoyment of the easement.3 3 However, since the advent of recording statutes
and probate court records, any objections based upon lack of notice or
indefiniteness have been swept away. It is common practice to record instruments conveying permanent rights in land. In the absence of such
recording, the subsequent purchaser, without actual notice, is not bound
if the easement is not open and visible, so as to constitute notice. Under
such circumstances, we should cease attempting to make distinctions with
reference to the assignability or inheritability of easements based on
whether we determine them to be in gross or appurtenant.
From a practical standpoint, it is perfectly obvious that, whether a
burden on land is called an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant, the two,things are of the same nature, and influence the property in
exactly the same way. Consequently, we should, in keeping with the
trend of modern law, be honest with ourselves and the future. We should
frankly say of these two types of easements: "The law will recognize no
difference in their legal incidents, as affecting ....property, merely because they have different names."1 4 Then we can freely apply the true rule
of construction-the intention of the parties.
33 Profits a prendre, although burdens of a very similar nature and subject to the same
criticisms, have been universally held to be inheritable or assignable (if granted in fee). See

note 17, supra.
34
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